OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Date: 4 June 1977

TO: Bernie

FROM: DG

SUBJECT: DCI Approval Item: SAFE/ADISS Commonality/Management Problem

REMARKS: 9 JUN 1977

The attached responds ~~to the~~ DCI's comments of ~~two months ago,~~ when he responded to an earlier memo on Subject by expressing his doubts that SAFE and ADISS are not really duplicative efforts. He asked for a description of the specific differences between the two systems, and noted his belief that the advantages of a single computer data base system for the Community seemed overwhelming.

The attached response and its proposed action plan seem excellent: the explanatory background paper is both thoughtful and convincing, especially concerning why there are deep differences between the kinds of data held by each system and the uses to which they are to be put.

The action plan essentially proposes:

- an independent contractor study (low cost);
- establishment of a DCI SAFE/ADISS working group;
- preparation of a Joint Management plan and Joint Project Office.

The action plan seems to satisfy the DCI's desire for cost-effective management while at the same time preparing the ground for an improved Community information handling system in which data bases required for Community use are interrelated. Some of these date bases would be "Community property"; others would be the property of analysts in agencies who need very detailed data which makes it possible for them to produce the information that is valid for multi-agency use.

ACTION

ACTION

8 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary of Defense

25X1 1. SecDef told me that we had, some time ago, notified quite a number of major industrialists about the [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] Can we check and see if this is the case and, if so, whether it is going to be very difficult to hold the lid on it.

2. SecDef also indicated a keen interest in the National Intelligence R&D Council. He thinks his new Under Secretary, Mr. Bill Perry, would be an ideal person to chair it. Mainly, though, he supports the idea of maintaining this Community-wide council. Let me know what you think and please let me know who's on the council now and who is the chairman.

25X1 3. I did raise with SecDef the ADISS and SAFE problem. I only indicated my preconception that we cannot afford to have two duplicative efforts going on like this. [redacted] memo is interesting but not convincing. What is difficult to understand is why Defense analysts and CIA analysts have different requirements if
25X1 the requirements [redacted] describes are in fact different. The implication that DoD analysts are less experienced than CIA does not hold up. The real issue is whether there are any generically different tasks to be done by the one or the other and, if so, whether those tasks are either necessary or could be satellited onto a single computer system as an excursion, or could be divorced from the main system and done on a small scale project. I would really appreciate your coming back to me with a simple statement of the specific differences in the requirements between the two systems and how we go about merging them into one. The advantages of a single computer data base system for the entire Intelligence Community are overwhelming in my mind. In addition, the specifications for two systems would have to be very persuasive to warrant what would appear to the public to be gross duplication.

SEE ATTACHED memo/paper, esp. p. 7 ff of memo

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

[redacted] 25X1

SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 77-1715

25 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, USN
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: SAFE and ADISS

1. Action Requested: DCI approval of the Specific Action Recommendations, Section IV of the attached, and summarized below.

2. Background: This memorandum responds to your request for a statement of the specific differences in the requirements between SAFE and ADISS, and comments on how we go about merging them into one system.

3. A comprehensive comparative requirements definition of the CIA SAFE and DIA ADISS systems cannot be accomplished until the Defense Intelligence Agency completes additional contractor-supported ADISS System Definition Studies.

4. At present, lacking the results of the DIA study, it is possible only to generalize about the SAFE/ADISS similarities and differences for combined system operational requirements. We have made comparisons as far as possible, and present them herewith in Sections I and III, attached.

5. Our conclusion at this point is that apparent dissimilarities in the presently-stated operational requirements of these two systems, to the extent that we can now evaluate them, do not necessarily mandate total dissimilarity in hardware and software. Nor do they negate the possibility that a single, shared analyst support system could potentially fulfill all the essential requirements of both agencies.

6. An independent, in-depth analysis at this time of both SAFE and ADISS, made by a well-qualified external contractor with no present relationship to either system, is desirable. We understand that CIA and DIA are now selecting such a contractor for a 60-day study.

25X1

7. The Specific Action Recommendations are:

A. Complete the DIA ADISS System Definition Study

Estimated Completion Date - September 1978
Estimated Cost - $ 1 M.

B. Continue the CIA SAFE System Design and Analysis Studies

Estimated Completion Date - September 1978
Estimated Cost - $ 6.2 M. (See Section IV, attached) pg 19

C. Retain Independent Contractor Now to Make Thorough Appraisal of SAFE and ADISS Current Documentation

Estimated Completion Date - 60-~~90 days~~ after go-ahead
Estimated Cost - $ 75 - 100 K.

D. Establish DCI SAFE/ADISS Working Group

Chairman: IC Staff. Members: CIA; DIA; others as appropriate, including NSA.

Tasks

-- Prepare Joint Management Plan for SAFE/ADISS, within 30 days after go-ahead.

-- Prepare staff study of pros and cons of establishing a Joint Project Office for SAFE/ADISS, within ~~90~~ 30 days and coincident with Contractor report.

-- Monitor external contractor for DCI. Provide policy guidance. Ensure continuing implementation of the Joint Management Plan.

-- Establish appropriate SAFE/ADISS Project Formal Review Milestones.

8. This issue is inherently complex, involving not only several difficult technical considerations associated with very large, multiple-access computer systems, but also issues of traditional individual agency prerogatives. I believe that the Specific Action Recommendations will provide the centralized control that is now perceived as needed to direct SAFE and ADISS toward the achievement of maximum commonality, consistent with the facts of the case and prudent technical principles.

25X1

SUBJECT: SAFE and ADISS DCI/IC 77-1715

Attachment

I. A Comparison of SAFE and ADISS

II. A Data Base System for the Entire Intelligence Community

III. Merging SAFE and ADISS

IV. Specific Recommendations

APPROVED: ______________________
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: ______________________
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: ______________________

Don't understand description of task in #C — It should be to study what is necessary to merge SAFE/ADISS (otherwise) & the costs of doing so are too great the answer would seem to do it
9/6/77 T.

I. A Comparison of ADISS and SAFE

1. The Similarities:

A. The SAFE and ADISS projects are conceptually and functionally similar in that both projects are aimed at supporting intelligence managers and production analytical personnel in the performance of their daily functions. The production analyst user constituency for each system is similar in terms of the gross numbers of analysts served, but differs in requirements for concurrent use, and in the geographic deployment of potential system subscribers.

B. The technical characteristics of major elements of supporting equipment for each system can be similar. A joint CIA/DIA committee, monitored by the DCI Intelligence Information Handling Committee, has identified the following hardware/software areas as potentially yielding significant savings through joint procurements or developments:

(1) Processors and unit record peripherals

(2) Storage devices and controllers

(3) Terminals

(4) Text search hardware/software

(5) Data-base management system

(6) Terminal support software.

C. In accordance with the urgings of the Congress, OMB, and the DCI, since September 1976, the two agencies have been jointly developing the bases of a management plan which will define the groundrules for realizing a high-level of commonality in the respective systems. While explicit

similarities and differences have been difficult to identify, this draft joint management plan, if properly implemented, should result in future economic benefits through the joint development and procurement of appropriate common items.

2. The Differences:*

A. The basis for differences in the information handling requirements of the sponsoring organizations is largely traceable to the differences in the primary missions of the two agencies, which to quote from E.O. 11905 are:

CIA: "Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military, sociological and geographic intelligence, to meet the needs of the President, the National Security Council, and other elements of the United States Government."

DIA: "Produce or provide military intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-defense agencies."

In other words, military subjects represent a small part of CIA's wide-ranging analytical responsibilities, while DIA is responsible primarily for military and military-related matters. This means that an information handling system for DIA should provide the maximum and the most cost-effective support to the specific problems in military intelligence analysis, while the system for CIA must have maximum flexibility and be adaptable to a greater variety of problems.

*Portions of this section are drawn from an internal working memorandum prepared by CIA for discussions with DIA on SAFE and ADISS.

B. These differences in function cause wide differences in the nature of the data bases built by the two agencies. Order-of-Battle (OB) files, for example, are central to the DIA effort. These files are highly structured, have standard terminology, and have formatted input procedures. In fact, a major objective of the ADISS effort is to introduce greater standardization so that data elements taken from several different files can be used to build new files. Such efforts are proper and cost-effective when supporting military intelligence analysis that deals with a relatively fixed number of quantitative features. With few exceptions, files built to handle CIA intelligence analysis problems cannot be designed with the structural formatting that works so well for most military analysis. A predetermined file structure quickly becomes useless, even a handicap, when dealing with the unpredictable behavior of foreign nations in the less-ordered fields of politics, economics and sociology, and with the more conceptual concerns of science and technology.

C. SAFE, therefore, is being designed to support: (a) a few central files that are generalized, as in a conventional library catalog, in order to provide a first-cut approach to intelligence research; and, (b) a large number of highly specialized, time-volatile files, built by individual analysts to handle specific research problems.

D. Mission differences also dictate a diverse technical approach to information support for the two agencies. Information support for DoD intelligence requirements must consider a worldwide network that can be accessed from Korea as easily as from Washington.

No different from CIA

Fortunately, the nature of military analysis problems permits a standardized system that can be used by anyone anywhere. The CIA system, however, is intended to support only analysts in the Washington area. Because most of the files will be textual and custom built for and by their local users, these files are planned as automated working tools (as well as a limited number of finished intelligence data bases), and they are not appropriate for general reference by persons in other organizations. — all one Big IC

E. These principal differences between the two projects, as presently conceived, are summarized in Table 1. These differences impact primarily on the technical areas of input processing, file building, retrieval, and output generation and distribution.

F. Simply stated, the CIA SAFE Project is an internally-oriented system designed to support the CIA intelligence production analysts primarily through giving them the capability to work with loosely-structured document-type information, while the DIA ADISS Project must not only support "internal" intelligence management and production functions, but must also provide information system services (OB, target data, etc.), to worldwide commands, using primarily structured data. — including CIA data & IVR, etc

This is not well presented or thought out — analysis is analysis in my view — you can't analyze is analysis and divide it into such incompatible categories without effort

Table 1. SAFE/ADISS System Comparison

Function/Capability	SAFE System	ADISS System
1. User Constituency	• Internal CIA (Washington Metropolitan area)	• Worldwide support of both DoD and non-DoD Decision Makers
2. Interface with other Information Handling Systems	• None currently planned • System potential for future external interfaces	• Access to over 50 large-scale file systems at NSA, CIA, DIA, NPIC, SAC, PACOM, & NORAD (COINS, NMIC, AIRES, and CCF Interfaces)
3. Principal Intelligence Outputs Supported	• National level analysis • Foreign economic, political, scientific, technical, military, sociological and geographic intelligence	• National & DoD-Level Analysis • Field Analysis • Time-Critical Analysis • Order of Battle, Target Data, Installation Intelligence
4. Content of Data Bases Accessed	• CIA centralized automated data bases • Analyst working files and data bases • Incoming electrical messages and mail	• DIA and field automated data bases and files • Highly structured information • Some raw, unevaluated intelligence (messages and hard copy)

Table 1. SAFE/ADISS System Comparison
(continued)

Function/Capability	SAFE System	ADISS System
5. User Functions	• Access data from CIA central files • Receive mail • Build analyst working files • Make analytical manipulations of unstructured data • Send info to other analysts	• Input to, update, and maintain official data bases worldwide • Transfer data in bulk worldwide • Access data from official files worldwide • Make analytical manipulations of formatted data • Build analyst working files
6. Terminal Availability for Analyst Use	• Individual analysts have terminal access at desks (projected 1200 concurrent users)	• Some individual analyst desk-side support augmented by terminal support centers (projected 150 concurrent users)
7. System Communications	• High-speed, localized communication system	• Conventional lower-speed, long-haul (worldwide) communications networks
8. Security	• All users have all-source clearances • Multi-level system security controls needs are minimal	• Variety of levels of clearances of users required

II. A Data Base System for the Entire Intelligence Community

1. The question has been raised as to whether it is possible to bring about a "single" computer data base system for the entire Intelligence Community. The answer in the short run is "no." This is because:

a. Community members are organizationally separate, and they have distinct missions;

b. There exists a longstanding functional division of intelligence responsibilities among Community members;

c. Providing adequate protection for different types of sources of intelligence has caused individual Community members to apply a variety of security policies and procedures to these varied types of intelligence information.(*) The result of these factors is that the Community today has not one but a considerable number of major data bases. Each of them is, generally speaking, designed, controlled, operated by, and located at the headquarters of the Community member whose mission and functions caused the initial establishment of that data base. Moreover, some of these data bases are fully automated, some are partly automated, and some are largely non-automated. They are designed to no single homogeneous set of specifications because the subject contents and the anticipated uses of these data vary widely, and because each was conceived of as a working tool to assist analysts in a particular organization.

(*) - For example, present NSA policy precludes electrical transmission of certain sensitive GAMMA items. (C)

2. The answer in the longer run is that what is both feasible and desirable is a much improved Community information handling system, within which some automated data bases would be identified as "community property" and would be maintained as the several related-but-separate parts of a total organized and interrelated system of data bases.

3. Within the Community, SIGINT, Imagery, and HUMINT have been collected and processed by separate organizations. Today, there are very large data bases which are divided initially into those three categories, and within by a variety of topical subdivisions. Those data bases are maintained separately for the most part, and the Community is accustomed to accessing them individually. As a practical matter, they could not be combined now without large costs, and before any such action were attempted, the cost-effectiveness of such a step should be thoroughly explored. This is not a matter of parochialism; in some cases it is a matter of sheer size.(*)

4. The work of organizations dealing with what Sherman Kent named "Positive Foreign Intelligence" (**) has been traditionally divided into three functions -- Collection, Processing, and the

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(*) - For example, the anticipated size by 1985 of an Imagery data base could be on the order of 10^{15} (1 quadrillion) characters of automated, rapidly-accessible storage: CIA/ORD Conference on Intelligence Information Processing in the 1980s, 6-7 January 1976, Proceedings, page 22. (S)

(**) - to distinguish this work from Counter Intelligence and from Intelligence Operations (i.e., clandestine activities)

Production of intelligence end-products. There are different types of data bases associated with each of these functions. (*)

5. An automated information handling system to be shared by the entire Intelligence Community should meet the test that the information therein has been shown to be of multi-agency interest, so as to give convincing evidence that the cost of making it available generally is warranted. This involves official decisions on divisions of labor among intelligence organizations, and on which analysts in what organizations need to know how much about what subjects.

6. Most intelligence data bases today are only partly automated. This is particularly true of bibliographic data bases, where much of the content may consist of clippings from published materials. An important characteristic of automated data bases is that the usability of their output is directly dependent on the human effort expended to index and format each item of information that is put in to the data base. This is an expensive and labor intensive activity, and any major changes from present practices would be reflected in increased budget needs of intelligence organizations performing this service.

7. An information handling system to be shared by the entire Intelligence Community is a desirable goal. The kinds of intelligence information that are potentially "ripe" for Community sharing are those

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(*) - For example, a HUMINT collector may maintain a requirements data base. An Imagery processor may maintain a working data base with many forms of imagery-related information that aid in his photogrammetric tasks. An economic intelligence analyst maintains a data base, say, on international trade statistics, which he is manipulating in order to produce an intelligence estimate. A military target analyst may have responsibility for using new incoming intelligence information to update a centralized data base that is solely devoted to the location of foreign missile sites.

organized sets of data that are useful in connection with the Production of intelligence end-products, rather than used in connection with the earlier stages of intelligence Collection and Processing. Moreover, those Production-related data bases which are potentially "ripe" for Community sharing are only those which have grown to be relatively stable in content and form and that have a track record of being of widespread interest to production analysts. This characteristic of a degree of maturity distinguishes those data bases from others which are direct appendages of working analysts, have the general character of working files, and by intention have no inherent "finished intelligence" character or official authenticity.

8. One of the fundamental lessons learned during the painful evolution of the COINS (Community On-Line Intelligence System) network is that not all of the data files and bases produced within a given agency can, or ought to be generally shared by the Community at large. Rather, selected data bases must be carefully defined, constructed, and maintained to assure significant and efficient interagency utilization. Today, COINS is the mechanism by which files within NSA, DIA, NPIC, and CIA can be accessed by many intelligence organizations.(*) The COINS Project Management Office has a good performance record in investigating ADP problems relating to

Why not have clearance & need to know

(*) - Over 5,000 queries on Imagery files alone are handled via COINS each month. Also, it is planned that SIGINT "product" information will eventually be available via COINS and will be updated every 30 minutes.

Community data bases and internetted systems. As has been indicated recently by the Chairman of the Intelligence R&D Council, this experience should be considered in the development of the SAFE and ADISS projects.

9. Before it would be possible to design a single, central system to provide efficient access by the entire Community (both DoD and non-DoD) to the computerized data bases now maintained by various Community members, several significant policy and technical issues must be resolved. These include:

A. Identify the desired future national/tactical user needs for intelligence, as a criterion for the design of Community-interest data bases and procedures for access thereto.

B. Prescribe revised policies for multi-level computer security and compartmentation within Community-interest data bases.

C. Simplify the ease of access to Community-interest data bases, through major improvements in multiple file retrieval languages.

D. Prescribe standards and agency responsibilities for the file quality and timely maintenance of Community-interest data bases.

E. Prescribe and implement appropriate principles for standardizing the recording of data elements within Community-interest data bases.

10. The DCI Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC) has recently embarked on a major Community effort to address these and other common ADP problems and issues, reporting regularly thereon to the PRC(I).

11. It should be anticipated that the solution for some of these difficult problems may require several years time, as well as funding for design and development studies and tests. These activities should be seen as part of the larger undertaking of establishing and implementing a comprehensive plan for a Community-wide information handling system.

12. In the interim, the development of the SAFE and ADISS System concepts should address efficient and cost-effective ways of technologically sharing those SAFE/ADISS data bases and files which are perceived to have potential Community utilization. In addition, the agencies responsible for these projects should take an active part in Community-wide efforts to insure adequate cross-fertilization among Community members facing the common issues and problems cited in paragraph 9.

III. Merging SAFE and ADISS

1. The design of a single system that would meet all of the presently conceived requirements for both CIA and DIA would be a truly formidable task, given the current state of ADP technology. In its review of the SAFE Project, a panel of outside consultants expressed the belief that while SAFE was feasible, its implementation pushed the state of the art.(*) The more complex system that would result from adding the DIA requirements to the SAFE system concept would represent a definite technological risk. However, pending completion of the DIA ADISS System Definition Phase, it can not be definitely claimed that such a combined system would be impractical.

2. There is therefore a wide range of options currently available to Community Managers regarding the future course of the SAFE/ADISS projects:

A. Totally Separate Hardware/Software Systems

- No common development; individual agencies proceed independently
- Separate and independent System Program Office (SPO) management structures
- Future system internetting requirement considered in design

(Option A is clearly unacceptable from a Community management standpoint.)

(*) SAFE Technical Oversight Committee. Convened in early 1975 by DCI to review concept and reaffirm feasibility of SAFE Project. Panel consisted of Dr. R. L. Garwin (IBM), Dr. Harold Bamford (NSF), Dr. Donald Bitzer (University of Illinois), and Dr. William Perry (ESL).

DCI executive secretary, and Chairman, National Intelligence R&D Council

B. Separate Systems, Maximum Hardware/Software Commonality

- Degree of commonality achievable determined by comparative user requirements studies (yet to be completed)
- Joint-agency program development monitoring would be accomplished in accordance with joint management plan (to be drafted)
- Future system internetting requirement considered in design

C. "Essentially Identical" but Separate Hardware/Software Systems

- Joint procurement of hardware/software to be achieved by Inter-Agency agreement or through a joint Inter-Agency SPO
- Minor software/hardware differences (where warranted)
- System internetting requirement considered in design

D. Single, Shared Hardware/Software System

- Common Processor (i.e., Major Hardware & Software)
- Agency-Peculiar Hardware/Software Subsystems to be developed (where warranted)
- Terminals deployed as required
- Joint Interagency SPO

3. The difficulty in selecting the "best" of the above System Configuration Options is aggravated by the fact that the two projects are out of phase with respect to one-another in their developmental cycles.(*) This circumstance leads to the recognition that there are two principal schedule sub-options as follows:

S-1. Continue both projects on their "currently approved" program definition schedules. However, preserve opportunities for design commonality through promulgation of a Joint Management Plan (June 1977)

S-2. Defer all, or a well-defined part of the implementation efforts of the CIA SAFE program pending the development of the necessary DIA ADISS System Definition data, in order to permit selection of a System Configuration Option (B through D above).

4. Conclusions

A. Pending completion of the DIA System Definition Study for the ADISS System, it is impractical at this time to make a sound technical recommendation that the functions of the two systems be merged into either "essentially identical" (but separate) data base systems, or a single shared system (Options C or D).

(1) Directing two disparate agencies to force-fit what are apparently distinct and incomplete system requirements into a single shared system or "essentially identical" systems at this time may result in

Point is then tasks are the same – then requirements are clear

(*) It has been estimated that the CIA SAFE Project is currently at least one year ahead of the DIA ADISS Project in terms of overall system development schedules.

either inefficient system implementation with unacceptable developmental risk, or significant developmental cost growth, or both.

(2) Given the observations of Section II of this report, the primary impetus to direct such a merger (at this point in time) would come, not from the near-term possibility of creating widely-shared intelligence data bases, but rather from the possibility of reducing or eliminating some duplicative development and implementation costs. The degree of achievable system commonality requires further extensive analysis, and it is possible that total costs of Options C or D could exceed those of Option B due to increased software complexities.

B. Option A is unacceptable from a Community Management standpoint.

C. Just as it is impractical at this time to conclude that the functions of the two systems should be merged into a single shared system, or "essentially identical" (but separate) information handling systems, it is also difficult, pending completion of the DIA ADISS System Definition Study, to defend Option B (separate systems, employing maximum feasible commonality) as the ultimate management and system configuration for SAFE/ADISS. However, pending the development of sufficient ADISS System Definition data to permit such an

ultimate System Configuration decision, the Option B concept offers the most cost-effective means to assure reasonable technological progress within a bounded funding commitment.

D. The selection of the appropriate Schedule Option (S-1 or S-2) is equally difficult:

(1) S-1 (i.e., continue both independent projects) is unattractive from a Community Management standpoint. It can be improved by prompt promulgation of a tightly-drawn Joint Management Plan.

(2) S-2 (i.e., defer SAFE) jeopardizes the CIA's efforts to rapidly implement a reasonably well-defined and long-overdue system while the DIA is in a "catch-up" mode. Furthermore, it threatens the CIA's capability to use sizable FY-77 (and possibly also FY-78) funds.

E. If the DCI perceives that failure to take action immediately to create a Joint Project Office (or implement comparable mechanisms) will seriously jeopardize all FY-78 funding for SAFE and ADISS now pending in budget requests before the Congress, it could be necessary to announce steps now that would lead in a logical way to a new joint Community management mechanism for these two projects. It would be hoped, however, that announcing the promulgation of a Joint Management Plan (within about 30 days), the initiation of a staff study to evaluate further joint management options (within about 60 days), and

the introduction now of an external contractor to appraise the planning and current documentation for SAFE and ADISS would be sufficiently convincing. There are political and managerial difficulties and risks if a decision were made to establish a Joint Project Office without first having worked out details on the specific authorities that individual agencies would be required to give up to such an office and the established procedures that would be altered. For example, the present procedures of DIA and CIA with respect to external procurement differ markedly, with CIA acting for itself and DIA using the Air Force's Rome Air Development Center (RADC) organization.

5. Specific recommendations relating to these conclusions are offered in the next section.

Note DCI

IV. Specific Action Recommendations

1. DIA System Definition: The DIA should complete the ADISS System Definition Study on as aggressive a schedule as possible. Although DIA presently projects that the total study will not be completed until approximately September 1978, it is the opinion of the Intelligence Community Staff that key portions of the data necessary to complete the SAFE/ADISS System Option Selection (Section III of this report) could be developed within a shorter time frame (possibly by 1 January 1978). DIA should reassess these schedules.

2. CIA System Design Studies: Pending the development of the necessary ADISS System Definition data, the CIA should proceed with continuing System Design and Analysis Studies and long-lead site preparation efforts. (The technological progress to be made during such studies will be largely applicable to any of the SAFE/ADISS System Options selected in the near-term.) The CIA should defer SAFE-peculiar hardware/software acquisition (i.e., not having common SAFE/ADISS application) until a SAFE/ADISS System Configuration Option selection is made. (See Section III of this report.) (*)

(*) In addition to the $6.2 M programmed for SAFE System Design and Analysis Studies, the CIA is currently programming to commit an additional $6.6 M in FY-78 for a SAFE "System Development" prime contract. (Total FY-77/78 budget is therefore $12.8 M.) The specific tasks to be performed under this prime contractor effort (prior to a SAFE/ADISS System Configuration Option Selection) should be reviewed, and limited to those tasks which have clear-cut common SAFE/ADISS application.

3. Independent Contractor Current Appraisal of SAFE/ADISS: Direct that an external contractor organization be selected forthwith to make a quick but searching appraisal of the planning and documentation of both SAFE and ADISS to date.(*) This organization should be one with experience in intelligence matters, but with no past role as a contractor for either project. The contractor should be tasked to make his report within 60 (preferably) to 90 (outside) days after go-ahead. The estimated cost of such a contract is $ 75 - $ 100 K., on the assumption that the contractor would utilize three people full time and a few more part time. This effort should be jointly managed and funded by the CIA and DIA.

4. DCI SAFE/ADISS Working Group: Under the formal auspices of the DCI, establish a Joint-Agency SAFE/ADISS Design and Development Working Group chaired by the IC Staff. The Working Group membership should include, as a minimum, representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, whose positions within their respective agencies permit them to assume a broad managerial, technological, and user-requirements perspective. In addition, it may be deemed desirable to include on this Working Group, representation from other interested Community member-agencies, and contractual technical consultants. This Working Group should prepare quarterly reports of its coordinated activities for the DCI, the IC Staff, and the IR&D Council. Its four initial tasks should be:

(*) - DIA and CIA have agreed to engage a contractor. We endorse this, but point out that the IC Staff, representing the entire Community, should monitor this work, as provided in paragraph 4, herein.

- To ensure that DIA and CIA are moving ahead together under common concepts as rapidly as possible. Complete and formally implement a Joint SAFE/ADISS Management Plan within 30 days after go-ahead.
- To prepare (for Community management) a staff study on ~~the pros and cons~~ how to of establishing a Joint Project Office. This study should be completed by 15 July 1977 if prompt go-ahead is received.
- Monitor the external contractor for DCI (para. 3. above). Provide policy guidance. Ensure continuing implementation of the Joint Management Plan.
- To establish SAFE/ADISS Project Formal Review Milestones, including recommended DCI and PRC(I) review and decision points.

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of SAFE and ADISS

ystem for the Entire Intelligence Community

and ADISS

mmendations

Don't understand description? task in IC — should be to study what is necessary to merge SAFE/ADISS (otherwise) the costs of doing so are too great the answer would be not to do it.
9/6/77

Central Intelligence

of Central Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

25 May 1977

(rec'd 1 Jun)

NOTE FOR THE DCI

Sir:

The attached is not a coordinated opinion. CIA and DIA are aware of its contents, however, and we believe it represents an honest approach to get on with the job.

25X1

John N. McMahon
AD/DCI/IC